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THE VALIDITY GENERALIZATION AND EXTENSION
OF THE REVISED IPTIS
William J. Hanshaw July 1976 31 pages
Directed by: D. A. Shiek, R. L. Miller, and C. C. Layne
Department of Psychology Western Kentucky University
The basic theoretical concepts of Rational-Emotive and
Rational-Behavior Therapy were discussed along with a
psychometric study of an inventory measuring irrational
tendencies. The revised Irrational Personality Traits
Inventory Scale (IPTIS), an inventory reported to measure
how an individual thinks, feels, and acts, was investigated
as to the soundness of its psychometric characteristics.
More specifically, the purpose of this study was to: (a)
determine the reliability of the revised IPTIS with a new
sample from an older population, i.e., college students,
(b) assess its concurrent validity with a measure of
neuroticism, and (c) evaluate the possible effects of a
socially desirable response set on the revised IPTIS
measure.
The subjects in this study were volunteers ranging in
age from 18 to 28. The total sample of 207 was composed of
92 males and 115 females. All subjects were group admin-
istered the revised IPTIS followed by the Eysenck Personality
Inventory (EPI). The reliability of the revised IPTIS was
determined by a Guttman split-half reliability procedure.
Concurrent validity and the influence of social desirability
was assessed by employing a Pearson product moment cor-
relation between the revised IPTIS and the criterion scales
of the EPI
The results suggested that the revised IPTIS was a
sound psychometric inventory with a wide range of variability
and was sensitive to varying degrees of rational and/or
irrational tendencies. The inventory demonstrated adequate
reliability with strong internal consistency (r ---- .90,
p < .01). The revised IPTIS demonstrated good concurrent
validity with neuroticism (r = .68, E < .01) and was not
significantly influenced by social desirability (r = -.23,
P > .01).
It was concluded that the revised IPTIS appeared to be
a reliable and valid measure of irrational and/or neurotic
tendencies. It did generalize and extend quite well to a
new sample from another population and maintained sound
psychometric characteristics. The results supported and
extended the conclusions of Ross (1976) and also the ABC
theory of emotional disturbance as presented by Ellis (1962).
It was suggested that the revised IPTIS appeared to
provide a useful tool both for future research and clinical
practice.
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Introduction and Review of Literature
From the ancient Stoic philosopher, in the first
century A.D., Epictetus wrote in The Enchiridion: "Men are
disturbed not by things, but by the view which they take of
them" (Ellis, 1973, p. 167). In the mid 1950's Albert Ellis
began developing a theory of personality, psychopathology
and a method of psychotherapy drawing from and extending
this philosophy. Summarized, Ellis (1962) states that A
is an objective event or stimuli, B is a cognitive evalu-
ation of the event and C is the resulting emotional
response. In other words, when a highly charged emotional
response follows a personally significant event, it may
appear that A causes C, but realistically the emotional
response is largely caused by the individuals belief or
cognitive evaluation. Conclusions from what is now a
classic article by Schacter and Singer (1962) report that
cognitive factors appear to be indispensable elements in
any formulation of emotion. Other studies by Schacter and
Wheeler (1962) and Latane' and Schachter (1962) support
their conclusions and the ABC theory of emotional distur-
bance.
Ellis (1962), in his system of psychotherapy, maintains
that since cognition precedes and accompanies emotions, one
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must begin changing cognitive evaluations before the
undesirable emotional response will be significantly
affected. Agreeably, human beings function as whole orga-
nisms who think, feel, and act. The degree of success in
therapy depends largely upon how well the individual
internalizes and incorporates rational cognition into daily
life. Consequently, changing one's thinking is only the
initial, and generally the easiest, step toward behavioral
change. Ellis believes that an individual's healthy, as
well as pathological, symptoms are not exclusively the
product of social learning, but the result of what he labels
"biosocial" learning (Ellis, 1973). This is the interaction
between the way one thinks, feels, and acts. In other
words, the environment interacts through the body and mind,
thus producing the self, i.e., an organism which is the
product of the interacting prerequisites. The same is true
for all other living organisms, but mankind has cognitive
abilities or intellect and tends to be self-talking and
self-evaluating, having powerful and innately predisposed
tendencies to think in rational as well as irrational and
self-defeating ways. This makes mankind uniquely neurotic
to greater or lesser degrees. An individual behaving in an
irrational manner (such as depression) has a logical reason
within his or her irrational belief system (e.g., "I need
1116m and can't live without him.") for feeling helpless and
hopeless just as 3ny living organism would if something
really needed was abruptly removed (e.g., air, water, food,
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and shelter).
One basic symptom of emotional disturbance is demand-
ingness and intolerance of oneself and/or others, pro
bably
the result of inconsistent love, approval, and success
(either actual or perceived). Misleadingly, individu
als
subjectively define merely their personal desire for 
love,
approval, success, and comfort as needs, oftentimes re
sulting
in panic and self-defeating behaviors. The degree 
of
pathology would depend on how strongly one has fo
rmed and
holds to such demanding beliefs. Habitual patterns
 evolve
during early childhood forming the personality or s
elf, and
will mcst likely continue in a similar pattern unless 
there
is a significant intervention allowing one to begin th
inking,
feeling, and behaving more independently. In short, 
to
become less narrow-minded and more accepting and tole
rant
of reality. The process of Rational-Emotive Therapy 
(RET)
involves actively confronting and disputing self-defeating
attitudes, thus helping the individual surrender the old
3nd adopt new ways of evaluating the same or similar
objective events. The individual is then given act
ive home-
work assignments as an exercise in coordinating thoug
hts,
feelings, and behavior.
Cognition can be coordinated with bodily functions 
and
strengthen or weaken the organism through the p
rocess of
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detachment. When an individual cognitively evaluates an
event implicit verbalizations are used to describe and
understand the event, i.e., self-talk. This is the mecha-
nism by which the individual either reinforces or works
toward extinguishing the well ingrained influences of the
past. Thus Ellis concludes that it is not entirely one's
miserable past which causes the present undesirable emotion,
but the consistent reindoctrination of old and strongly
reinforced beliefs.
Several studies lend support that self verbalizations
affect emotional states. Rimm and Litvak (1969) report that
affective verbal stimuli are more emotionally arousing than
neutral stimuli, concluding that self-verbalizations have
a direct influence on emotional arousal. In another study,
using the galvanic skin response (GSR) as a measure of
affective arousal, Russell and Brandsma (1974) conclude
that irrational self-verbalizations were capable of pro-
ducing an emotional response in line with Ellis ABC theory
and predictions derived from classical conditioning theory.
Rational-Emotive theory appears to be well grounded in terms
of empirical research and practitioners of RET claim
remarkable success (DiLoreto, 1971; Ellis, 1957; Karst &
Trexler, 1970; Maultsby, 1971c; Meichenbaum, 1971;
Meichenbaum, Gilmore, & Fedoravicus, 1971; Taft, 1965;
Trexler & Karst, 1973; Trexler, 1973).
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But what is considered to be rational or irrational?
Ellis (1962) presented eleven specific values or attitudes
which he considered to be irrational and common throughou
t
our culture. He claimed that strong endorsement of t
hese
values would inevitably lead to widespread neurosi
s.
McDonald and Games (1973), in an attempt to validate 
Ellis'
eleven irrational values, reported significant r
elation-
ships between those eleven values and (a) Eysenc
ks'
Neuroticism Scale, (b) the Taylor Manifest Anxiety
 Scale,
and (c) Internal-External Locus of Control. The
ir results
were interpreted as providing support for the theo
ry that
neuroticism and emotional disturbance is, for th
e most part,
the result of harboring an irrational belief syste
m.
Employing the ABC theory of Ellis, Maultsby (197
1a) de-
veloped a modification of RET and called his system 
Rational-
Behavior Therapy (RBT). He operationally defined 
rational
behavior around five criterion. Maultsby stat
ed that one's
behavior is rational if it (1) is based on objecti
ve reality,
(2) is life preserving, (3) is goal producing, (4)
 eliminates
significant emotional conflict, and (5) eliminat
es signifi-
cant trouble with others. The first criterion, 
i.e., objec-
tive reality, is defined as that which has its e
ssentials for
existence fulfilled (e.g., reality is free of 
value judg-
ments, neither good nor bad, it just is). Or 
relating to
cognition, objective reality is defined as 
verbalizations of
facts and events that could be measured by 
a recording
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device (e.g., a camera) or other means, such as statistics.
Maultsby believes the brain functions poorly as a camera
and evaluates reality much the way a programed computer
would interpret and respond to incoming data. One program
would differentiate the significant from the insignificant
data (analogous to perception) and a second program would
analyze the data (analogous to thinking). The interaction
between the two would determine the direction and degree of
the response. The second criterion is defined as thoughts
and behavior leading to preserving one's life. The
remaining criterion are self-explanatory, though very
subjective in nature and fluctuating from time to time.
Goals change among and between individuals as does
tolerance to personal and environmental discomfort. Thus,
rational behavior is not absolute, but must be tailored
among and between individuals to help achieve a common
goal, such as a more rational and unified society. A
rationally thinking individual perceives or accepts reality
as it is and then acts in one's own self-defined best
interest in order to pursue individual goals.
When an event is perceived, it is evaluated using
symbols which are learned associations with reality.
Perceptions are then evaluated and labeled by one's atti-
tudes over and over again. Consequently, one learns to
form strong opinions about reality, which are many times
based on insufficient and inaccurate information, such as
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"snakes are slimy and evil," "that dirty louse," etc. In
addition, other statements like, "I should not have failed
my final exam," in essence deny reality and often lead to
self-defeating behavior, e.g., guilt. Realistically, one
should have done exactl,: what he did because all of the
prerequisites were there in order for the event to occur.
Consequently, if he desires to pass the next exam, he had
better work toward establishing the prerequisites, i.e.,
studying rather than prerequisites leading to self-
devaluation. Actually, he wished he had not failed, but
wishing in this manner is quite distinct from reality.
This distinction is grossly evident in neurotic and/or
psychotic behavior.
Maultsby (1971a) collected numerous statements which
he found to be consistently adopted by clients with whom
he worked. He categorized them into three separate
inventories measuring perceptions, beliefs, and traits.
For example: "I am a real louse," is an inaccurate
perception stemming from the belief that, "I should not
have failed." The trait would be the symptom of anger or
guilt. Maultsby entitled his inventory, Your Irrational
Personality Trait Inventory Scale (YIPTIS). The inventory
consists of the Common Perception Inventory, Common Belief
Inventory and Common Trait Inventory, totaling 137 items.
He incorporated al/ three measures since rational and/or
irrational tendencies are global patterns and not only a
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process of objective cognitive criteria. In other words,
an individual can adopt irrational beliefs, but the degree
to which they are internalized is reflected by feelings
and behavioral traits. He noted that this inventory was
developed primarily as a counseling facilitator and not
specifically for research purposes.
Ross (Note 1) modified Maultsby's YIPTIS and designed
a revised form called Irational Personality Traits Inventory
Scale (IPTIS). The instrument consists of 52 items designed
to assess the global degree to which high school students
have irrational perceptions, beliefs, and traits about
themselves and others. The items were selected from the
initial 137 items by selecting only those which demon-
strated high internal consistency (i.e., item-total
correlations greater than .40). Developmental data were
collected from two stratified random samples of high
school students (n = 419 and 216). He reported that the
instrument correlated significantly with the Spielberger
Trait Anxiety Scale (r = .78). He concluded that his
findings were consistent with the theoretical notions of
irrationality and anxiety as explained by Maultsby (1971a).
His report also indicated that the instrument had high
internal consistency (r = .94). The internal consistency
of perceptions, beliefs, and traits were felt in line with
Maultsby's operational definition of irrationality.
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In summary, the ABC theory of Elli.s holds that emotional
disturbance primarily results from consistent reindoctri-
nation of unrealistic values adopted by an innately
predisposed and self-evaluating human being. Individuals
imply agreement or disagreement to such values via implicit
verbalizations or self-talk, which may or may not be
accurate interpretations of reality. Maultsby (1971a)
introduced a modification of RET and called his system RBT.
He presented five criterion for evaluating rational or
irrational tendencies. These criterion for rational
behavior were a combination of objective and subjective
evaluations. Throughout his years of clinical practice,
Maultsbv collected many irrational beliefs, faulty per-
ceptions, and traits symptomatic of irrationality. From
this collection he developed a personality inventory called
YIPTIS. A revised form of this instrument, called the
revised IPTIS, was constructed by Ross (Note 1) drawing
from the YIPTIS item pool. This new form was developed
with ninth, tenth, and eleventh grade high school students.
The revised IPTIS demonstrated sound psychometric charac-
teristics as well as significant correlations with anxiety
with the original developmental sample.
The general purpose of this study was to extend Ross'
work to a new sample from another population. More
specifically the study was designed to: (a) determine the
reliability of the revised IPTIS with a new sample from an
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alder population, i.e., college students, (b) assess its
concurrent validity with a measure of neuroticism, and (c)
evaluate the possible effects of a socially desirable
response set on the revised IPTIS measure. The results of
this study would be expected to: (1) expand the reliability
and validity of the revised IPTIS by generalizing and
extending the results of Ross (Note 1) to a sample from an
older population while evaluating the possible influence o
f
social desirability, (2) lend theoretical support to th
e
ABC theory, and (3) provide further basis for evaluatin
g





The revised Irrational Personality Trait Inventory
Scale (IPTIS) is an instrument consisting of 52 items
designed to assess the degree to which individuals may have
irrational perceptions, beliefs, and traits about them-
selves and others. Ross (Note 1) selected items from an
initial pool of 137 items on the YIPTIS (Maultsby, 1971a).
Only those items which demonstrated high internal con-
sistency (i.e., item-total correlations greater than .40)
were selected. A copy of the inventory is presented in
Appendix A. The original developmental data for the
revised IPTIS were collected from two groups of ninth,
tenth, and eleventh grade high school students (n = 419 and
216). The inventory showed a high degree of internal con-
sistency (r = .94) and correlated relatively highly with
the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale (r = .78). The subject
response and scoring modes were on a self-rating five
point Likert scale ranging from "never" to "usually" in
regards to items identifying irrationality. For the purpose
of the present study items were ordered randomly on the test
booklet and did not appear in the same order as in the
11
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original revised IPTIS. This step was taken to reduce the
possible influence of response bias relating to item order.
Criterion Measures
The Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck,
1968) was utilized as a measure of irrational and neurotic
tendencies. Eysenck identifies neuroticism as indicative
of emotional lability and over-reactivity. High scoring
individuals tend to be emotionally over-responsive and
have difficulties returning to a normal state after emo-
tional experiences. The EPI was selected primarily
because: (1) it was reported to be a reliable and valid
measure of neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968), (2) it
was relatively short and took minimal time in admin-
istration, and (3) it also yielded a social desirability or
response set score.
Subjects
Subjects were volunteers from the total available
population of undergraduate students enrolled in intro-
ductory psychology classes at Western Kentucky University.
There were a total of 207 subjects consisting of 92 males
and 115 females between the ages of 18 and 28.
Procedure
The revised IPTIS was administered in a classroom
setting followed by the EPI during the spring semester of
the school year. Instructions were given verbally and in
written form and are presented in Appendix A. Subjects
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were only identified by their sex and age. Each was
instructed to record his/her responses on separate answer
sheets, i.e., one for each inventory.
Statistical Analysis
Both answer sheets were collected from each subject and
machine scored. Statistical analyses were performed to
determine descriptive characteristics, reliability, and
validity. A Guttman split-half reliability procedure was
used to assess internal consistency. A Pearson product
moment correlation coefficient was employed to assess con-
current validity and influence of social desirability.
Results were reported significant at the .01 level.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics obtained in this study for the
revised IPTIS are presented in Appendix B. A comparative
analysis of these statistics with those obtained by Ross
was impossible since his data were not available. However,
the data from this study suggested that the revised IPTIS
was a sound inventory with a wide range of variability and
was sensitive to varying degrees of rational and irrational
tendencies.
The Guttman split-half yielded a reliability coefficient
of .90, p < .01. When compared with the results of Ross
(r = .94), the revised IPTIS did generalize and extend quite
well to a new sample from another population of older
subjects and maintained high internal consistency. In
addition, it was found that random ordering of the items
did not significantly affect its reliability. Consequently,
the revised IPTIS demonstrated adequate reliability in the
form of high internal consistency.
The Pearson product moment procedure between the
revised IPTIS and the neuroticism scale of the EPI resulted
in a concurrent validity coefficient of .68, E < .01. As
reported previously, Ross found a significant correlation
(r = .78) between the revised IPTIS and anxiety. By
14
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comparing the two correlation coefficients, the revised
IPTIS was found to extend from a specific irrational trait,
i.e., anxiety, to a broader psychological measure of
neuroticism. Consequently, the revised IPTIS demonstrated
good concurrent validity with a specific irrational trait
as well as the measure of neuroticism as defined by
Eysenck. Thus, Maultsby's operational definition of
irrational tendencies (as measured by the revised IPTIS)
was consistent with Eysenck's broader notion of neuroticism.
The Pearson correlation procedure between the revised
IPTIS and the social desirability scale on the EPI
resulted in a concurrent validity coefficient of -.32,
E > .01. Consequently, a socially desirable response set
did not appear to be related to the measure of irrationality
obtained on the revised IPTIS. In other words, the revised
IPTIS measure appeared independent of a "faking good"
response mode.
Rational theory, whether employing the techniques of
Ellis or Maultsby, is a very objective and humanistic
method of perceiving and facilitating the whole human being.
In psychotherapy attention is focused on thinking, feeling,
and acting with attempts to help others perceive or accept
reality as it is and then acting in one's own self-defined
best interest in order to pursue individual goals.
The revised IPTIS, an inventory that claims to measure
how an individual thinks, feels, and acts, was investigated
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as to the soundness of its psychometric characteristics.
More specifically it was to (a) determine the reliability
of the revised IPTIS with a new samp]e from an older
population, i.e., college students, (b) assess its con-
current validity wiLh measure of neuroticism, and (c)
evaluate the possible effects of socially desirable
response set on the revised IPTIS measure.
The results from this study suggested that the revised
IPTIS was a sound psychometric inventory with a wide range
of variability and was sensitive to varying degrees of
rational and irrational tendencies. The inventory
demonstrated good reliability with strong internal con-
sistency. It did generalize and extend quite well to a
new sample and another population of older subjects and
maintained sound psychometric characteristics. In addition,
the revised IPTIS demonstrated good concurrent validity
with both a specific irrational trait, i.e., anxiety, as
well as a broader measure of neuroticism as defined by
Eysenck (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968). Finally, social
desirability or "faking good" did not appear significantly
related to the scores obtained on the revised IPTIS.
In conclusion, the revised IPTIS was demonstrated to
be a reliable and valid measure of irrational and/or
neurotic tendercies. The results supported and extended the
conclusions of Ross (Note 1). Also, Maultsby's operational
definition of irrational tendencies (as measured by the
17
revised IPTIS) were found to be correlated wit
h Eysenck's
measure of neuroticism. The results also lent s
upport to
the ABC theory of emotional disturbance as pre
sented by
Ellis (1962). Thus, the revised IPTIS appeare
d to provide
a useful tool both in future research and cl
inical practice.
Future research may be directed toward e
xtending and
generalizing the revised IPTIS to other po
pulations such as
younger or older sublects than reported 
presently, inpatient/









The following statements descri
be beliefs many people
hold, feelings, and perceptions (
observations) that people
often make about themselves. Besi
de each statement is an
estimate range. Please mark on 
the answer sheet not the
booklet) the word which seems most




c. OFTEN AS NOT
d. FREQUENTLY
e. USUALLY
This form is concerned with you
r usual state of mind,
so answer with your most common e
xperience regarding each
item. Please respond to each ite
m honestly and be sure
not to skip any statements. There a
re no right or wrong
answers to any of the statements.
1. I believe I am a born
worrier.
SOME- OFTEN FRE-
NEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUA
LLY
a
2. I won't be able to
accept myself until I
get more self-
confidence. a
3. No one seems to care
enough about me. a
4. It seems to me that I
don't live up to my
potential (i.e.,
abilities and talents). a
5. I believe there is me
and another "real" me. a
6. I feel cut off or
alienated from people




NEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
a
7. I feel as though I
am me and not me at
the same time. a
8. In order to get
people to like me,
I pretend to be dif-
ferent from how I
really am. a
9. Even now, if I think
of regretted past
events, I still get
angry, aaxious or
depressed. a
10. When I am upset or
angry about some
thing or someone, I
am likely to say
things like "why does
everything have to
happen to me?" or
"how could he or she
have done such a
thing?" a
11. My emotions change




12. T don't get over
emotional hurts
quickly. a
13. I am dissatisfied




NEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
14. I am very sensitive
to social slights:
i.e., my feelings are
hurt easily. a
15. My life seems worth-
less and unproductive. a
16. I believe that if
people would just be
honest with me, I
wouldn't have many
emotional problems. a
17. When faced with a dif-
ficult task or some-
thing that I don't
want to do, I am likely
to start thinking that
"I can't do it" or "I
am going to blow it." a
18. I feel inferior to some
other people. a
19. I really get upset if
I think people are
thinking about me
things that I do not
like people to think
about me. a
20. I have guilt feelings
about my failures. a
21. I think that I am a
nothing, no good,
worthless person, and
I get very upset. a
22. Even though I enjoy
someone's company, if
they don't love me or
care for me as much as




NEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
23. I have tried to change
myself, but it seems
I can't do it. a
24. I believe I need more
self-confidence. a
25. I get very upset when
I am alone for many
hours or a day or so. a
26. I am uncomfortably
depressed. a
27. When trying to make
decisions, I change




28. What some people think
of me is as important
to my feelings as what
I think of myself. a
29. I refuse to accept
myself when I am a
failure. a
30. I don't seem to be as
good a person as I can
and ought to be. a
31. I believe that if
certain people were to
treat me the way they
should, I could feel
better and/or accept
myself better. a
32. The solution to most
of my problems is for
certain people to care
enough for me to meet
my dependency needs. a
23
SOME- OFTEN FRE-
NEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
33. I feel anxious, or
nervous, or "high-
strung"--almost like
I am waiting for an
unknown terrible
thing to happen. a b c d P
34. I find myself
thinking about things
I don't want to think
about. a
35. I wake up feeling
afraid to face the
day. a
36. I worry about or I
get afraid of the "bad"
or negative things that
people, even strangers,
may think or say about
me, that I don't do some
harmless fun things
that I want to do. a
37. It seems to me that
I am a failure. a
38. I don't seem to have
enough self-confidence. a
39. Even though I don't
experience physical
pain, when people
behave toward me in an
undesirable manner, I
feel badly. a
40. I really get upset if
I think that I have
been used. a
41. I believe that I
would like and accept




NEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
42. I spend a lot of time
trying to decide what
the true meaning of
life is. a
43. When people treat me
unfairly or unjustly,
it causes me emotional
pain that is worse than
most physical pain. a
44. I actually hate
myself. a
45. When I am attempting
a difficult task, I am
likely to give up
quickly and later
realize that I could
have done the task if
I had continued. Then
I feel guilty or dis-
satisfied with myself
as a person. a
46. When things that
really matter to me
don't go right, it
upsets me very much. a
47. I feel uncomfortable
lonely even when there
are people around me. a
48. I get upset about
trivial things. a




50. The very time I
decide to be carefrec
and loose, something




NEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
51. When I don't stay a
little tense about
things I have to do,
I forget to do them. a
52. It seems to me that I
am not intelligent
enough. a
Revised IPTIS Descriptive Statistics
27
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